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Abstract 
In this paper we use empirical evidence from the UK to consider how entrepreneurs demand 
for external finance changed as the economy continued to be mired in its third and fourth 
years of recession and whether or not external finance has become more difficult to access as 
the recession progressed. We find that older firms and those with a higher risk rating, and a 
record of financial delinquency, were more likely to have a demand for external finance. The 
opposite was true for women led businesses and firms with positive profits. In general 
finance was more readily available to older firms throughout the recession but banks were 
very unwilling to advance money to firms with a high risk rating or a record of any financial 
delinquency. We find that a maximum of 42,000 smaller firms were denied credit November 
2011, which was significantly lower than the peak of 119,000 reported by Cowling, Liu and 
Ledger (2012) for the UK in the winter of 2009.  
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1. Introduction  
The financial crisis, which began unfolding in September 2008, contributed to a fall of 
6.4% in UK GDP in the subsequent six quarters that constituted the first official recession. 
This equates to around three years of post-war trend level economic growth for the UK 
economy (Cowling, Liu and Ledger, 2012).  Even four and a half years into the recession, 
and in the early post-recession period, GDP is 3.31% lower than its pre-recession figure. As 
the crisis had its roots in the credit markets, in particular the investment banking sector, retail 
banks and credit institutions became increasingly unwilling to lend to the personal and 
business sector, particularly those financial institutions with investment divisions that were 
overexposed in riskier lending products and markets. Bank of England figures show that net 
monthly flows of small business lending fell from £7.4bn in 2007 to an overall net 
repayment of £3.9bn in 2009 (BOE Trends in Lending, April 2011), and a further net 
repayment of £2.1bn in November 2012 (BOE Trends in Lending, January 2013). Loan to 
value rates declined considerably meaning that firms without surplus cash balances were 
quantity constrained, even when financial institutions were prepared to advance credit. 
Further, the cost of small firm credit initially increased to 4%, and then up to a current level 
of 4.7% even when base (interest) rates fell rapidly to 0.5 per cent where they have remained 
to date.  
Banks have been accused of not lending to small and medium enterprises (SMEs, 
businesses with 0 to 249 employees) by the popular press and politicians of all parties since 
2008 and this allegation remains a common feature of media and populist ire. It is true that 
gross lending facilities granted have fallen to 45% of their 2007 volume, but it is also true 
that businesses have been repaying outstanding loans to reduce their future interest 
repayments as cash flows have been squeezed by extended invoice payments periods and 
more generally be falling demand. Overlaid on top of the current recessionary environment 
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is the Basle III capital adequacy requirements placed on banks which may limit the pool of 
money available to lend to the business sector. 
In the UK, the Business Secretary Vince Cable announced on the 24th September 2012 
the first steps in creating a Government-backed business bank, including new Government 
funding of £1 billion. It will aim to attract private sector funding so that when fully 
operational, it is predicted that the bank could support up to £10 billion of new and 
additional business lending. The Government’s aim is to build a single institution that will 
address long-standing, structural gaps in the supply of finance. It will aim to bring together 
in one place Government finance support for small and mid-sized businesses. The business 
bank will also control the Government’s interests in a new wholesale funding mechanism 
which will be developed to unlock institutional investment to benefit SMEs. The decision to 
undertake this level of policy intervention explicitly assumes that the case for banks unfairly 
rationing the supply of credit to smaller businesses is proven. But this is not as clear cut as 
assumed, particularly their assessment of the scale of the problem. For example, recent  
evidence by Cowling, Liu and Minniti (2013) who, using a large-scale UK data set covering 
the recession from 2008, found that whilst 55.6% of the total of 30,000 discouraged 
borrowers (2.5% of the SME stock) would have probably received loans had they applied, 
this only represents 17,000 loans. With an average credit facility of around £41,000 to the 
SME sector this equates to £701m in potential lending. For term loans the average loan size 
is around £60,000 which equates to £1.02bn. Importantly, 84% of UK overdraft facilities to 
SMEs are for less than £50,000 and half for less than £10,000, and 78% of loans are for less 
than £100,000 (BDRC Continental, 2012). More generally, Cowling, Liu and Ledger (2012), 
using the same UK data set, found that in total 73,000 SMEs were refused loan requests in 
2009/10. If all these loan requests that were turned down were mistakes by banks (i.e they 
were good lending proposals and banks were making a Type 1 error), this would equate to 
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around £4.4bn. But this is not likely to be the case and the figure can be seen as representing 
a maximum potential missing loan market if all lending propositions were put forward by 
good quality entrepreneurs running low risk businesses. This is even more important given 
the key finding from US work on SME financing by Cavalluzzo and Wolken (2005) which 
found that differences in credit history explain most of the difference in [loan] denial rates. 
With these issues in mind, it is important to understand not only how many smaller 
businesses are denied access to credit when applying for loans or overdraft facilities 
(commitment loans in the US), but what differentiates smaller firms who are granted loans 
from those who are refused loans. And as the finally climbs out of the prolonged economic 
recession, the dynamic nature of the banking sector and capital markets makes up-to-the 
minute evidence more pertinent. It is the intention of this paper to use a unique 6 wave 
longitudinal data set for the UK (BDRC Continental), which spans the period from July 2011 
to March 2013 the 3rd and 4th years since the financial crisis in September 2008, to address 4 
key questions;  
• What is the current level of demand for credit from the small business sector and has 
this changed over time?  
• What is the current level of supply of credit to the small business sector and has this 
changed over time?  
• How many smaller firms have been denied credit and has this changed over time? 
• What differentiates smaller businesses that make successful loan applications from 
those who are unsuccessful? 
In doing so, we hope to add to our general understanding of what really happens in the 
market for small business financing 3-5 years into an economic downturn and in the early 
post-recession period, from both a demand and supply perspective. This context is 
particularly interesting and unique (see Fig 1) as economic recessions in the UK do not 
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normally last this long (NIESR, 2012). This will enable us to consider what the potential 
impacts of credit rationing on the small business sector are and also identify areas 
government action might be appropriate. We will also assess whether their plans for the 
‘Business Bank’ stand up to the evidence.  
Fig 1: UK economic recessions: How recessions compare 
[INSERT FIG 1 HERE] 
Source: National Institute for Economic and Social Research, 2012. 
2. A Generic Review of Research on Small Business Finance 
The subject of financial constraints or credit rationing has been the focus of a 
considerable body of theoretical work, and the existence of credit rationing has been 
examined extensively (Berger and Udell, 1992; Cowling, 2010; Goldfeld, 1966; Jaffee, 1971; 
King, 1986; Slovin and Slushka, 1983; Sofianos et al., 1990). Previous literature generally 
focuses on the supply-side of the credit market and assumes that information based problems 
discourage banks from advancing as much credit as entrepreneurs with potentially viable 
investment opportunities demand even when they are willing to pay more for loans (this is 
classic Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981, credit rationing). This supply-side ‘funding gap’ has been 
excessively used to justify government intervention to increase lending, regardless of the 
creditworthiness of borrowers (De Meza and Webb, 2000; Nightingale et al, 2009). 
The negligence of demand-side constraints in small business financing has resulted in 
our fairly limited understanding on the extent of ‘true’ credit rationing (Levenson and 
Willard, 2000), particularly given the evidence that small businesses have a clear pecking 
order of finance which favours debt (Hamilton and Fox, 1998), and the use of bootstrapping 
for rationed entrepreneurs (Irwin and Scott, 2010). Information asymmetry between lenders 
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and borrowers may not necessarily lead to under-investment. Particularly under certain 
assumptions, the unobservable quality of entrepreneurs may indeed result in investment 
exceeding the optimal level (De Meza and Webb, 1987, 2000). On the other hand, informed 
financiers screening firms that are not commercially attractive out of the loan market may 
actually be a rational behaviour indicating an efficient market. In this sense, some firms are 
simply not ‘investment ready’ (Mason and Harrison, 2001). Conceptualising the small 
business finance problem from both supply and demand sides would produce a more 
systemic framework for developing future entrepreneurial policy. This more holistic market 
perspective would draw attention to the simultaneity problems associated with building a 
funding system of many complex component parts (Nightingale et al, 2009). The current 
economic environment and the high uncertainty and complexity inherent in it provide a 
unique context to investigate the co-ordination of supply and demand and its effect on SME 
financing market. 
The rest of this section review the key studies on the supply as well as the demand of 
small business finance, based on which we set out the main hypotheses of this paper. 
2.1. Loan Supply 
The majority of SMEs rely on internal sources such as personal savings or retained 
earnings to fund their investment and only a small proportion have tried to obtain finance 
from external sources (Cosh et al, 2009; Cowling et al, 2012; Fraser, 2005). However, the 
supply of external finance to SMEs differs fundamentally from larger firms in the sense that 
private debt and equity markets are the only markets SMEs have access to whilst larger firms 
have access to both private and public markets (Berger and Udell, 1998). As suggested in 
their seminal work on small business finance, Berger and Udell (1998) conceptualised the 
supply of capital as a dynamic process which changes given SMEs’ needs and options, as 
well as the degree of information opacity between firms and fund suppliers. In this sense, 
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internal funds, trade credit, and/or angel finance are more appropriate for seed and start-up 
firms with little finance need, while early-growth firms have more access to venture capital 
and bank finance, and finally private equity is more suitable for firms with sustained growth 
and the highest capital needs. However, a central tenet of Berger and Udell’s model is the 
inter-connectedness between different sources of finance on a size/age/information 
continuum and sources of funding may be substitutes or complements, thus creating a 
‘funding escalator’ from business formation to a successful market exit. 
The most common source of external funding is commercial (high street) banks 
(Colombo and Grilli, 2007; de Bettignies and Brander, 2007). Yet not all SMEs that apply 
for external credit are successful (Fairlie and Robb, 2007; Levenson and Willard, 2000; Shen, 
2002; Cowling, Liu and Ledger, 2012). This occurs for many reasons including lack of asset 
cover (Coco, 2000), poor information flows giving rise to moral hazard and adverse 
selection issues (Diamond, 1984; Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984), non-viable 
projects, poor management teams, and exogenous factors such as unfavourable economic 
conditions. The issue of ‘unfair’ credit rationing, that is not based on borrower quality 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), has been the focus of a large volume of literature (Cowling and 
Mitchell, 2003; Fraser, 2009), and has been used to justify government intervention in the 
form of loan guarantee programmes (Cowling and Clay, 1994; Cowling, 2010; Riding, 1997; 
Cowling and Siepel, 2013). The counter-argument, that banks are rational and efficient 
processors of information, given their sophisticated data and information processing systems 
and hundreds of thousands of SME account histories, is made by de Meza and Southey 
(1996), and, in a later paper (de Meza, 2004) who argues that over-lending is more typical of 
the SME credit market. Thus, for firms with high levels of information opacity and the 
subsequent agency problems, equity is a more appropriate form of finance especially for 
high-growth, high-risk new ventures (Berger and Udell, 1998; Gompers and Lerner, 1999, 
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2001a, 2001b; Keuschnigg and Nielsen, 2003, 2004; Mason, 2009; Maier and Walker, 1987). 
Based on the above discussion, we formulate the following hypotheses regarding SME loan 
supply: 
HS1: Early- and later-stage SMEs (SMEs more than 2 years old) are more likely to be 
successful in bank loan application. 
HS2: SMEs with higher risks and financial delinquency are less likely to get the loan 
sought. 
HS3: SMEs’ loan applications supported by collateral are more likely to be successful. 
2.2. Loan Demand 
In a perfect market, enterprise value should be independent of capital structures chosen 
(Modigliani and Miller, 1958). However, the capital market is far from perfect and firms 
have varying preferences over different forms of external finance either due to tax 
considerations or information asymmetry (Myers, 2001). Since external finance is not 
costless, firms with financing needs will primarily look into internal sources of funds and 
only turn to external sources when internally generated funds cannot satisfy the firm’s 
capital requirement (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). With regard to external finance, 
given the tax deductibility of interests on debt, managers tend to take advantage of this tax 
shield until the benefit is fully offset by the possible cost of financial distress or credit down-
grading caused by higher leverage level (MacKie-Mason, 1990; Graham, 1996). This trade-
off theory is supplemented by the pecking-order theory (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 
1984) based on the information asymmetry between investors and firm managers. According 
to this theory, debt is preferred to equity because new equity issues, which would delude 
shareholders’ ownership of the firm, could be taken by potential investors as a signal that the 
existing stock is overvalued (Asquith and Mullins, 1986; Dierkens, 1991; Eckbo, 1986; 
Shyam-Sunder, 1991). Therefore, investors with inferior information would require a higher 
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return for equities. However, this sequence could be reversed if instead the informational 
advantage is on investor side, especially in the case of entrepreneurial finance (Garmaise, 
2000). 
The demand-side counterpart to this supply-side body of literature focuses on the small 
business financing life-cycle (Berger and Udell, 1998) and essentially relates age, size, and 
information availability to usage of more sophisticated forms of capital alongside a 
continued demand for short and medium-term bank loans. The discussion then focuses on 
how entrepreneurs can overcome these information problems by building relationships 
(Bester, 1985; Behr and Gutler, 2007; Petersen and Rajan, 1994) or, in the absence of 
relationships, by offering collateral as security against loans (Coco, 2000; Cowling, 1999; 
Leeth and Scott, 1989). Given the widespread agreement that lack of credit can restrict the 
ability of entrepreneurs to invest and that this can reduce rates of innovation, job creation 
and other positive economic externalities, it is perhaps surprising that relatively less attention 
has been paid to the determinants of the demand for credit from the entrepreneurial sector, 
particularly in a recessionary environment when many businesses are paying off debt. This is 
our theoretical contribution to the credit rationing debate, and complements earlier work by 
Cressy (1995) which identified owner control as a key element in the decision to apply for 
debt finance. Other authors have noted that entrepreneurs are more likely to be excessive 
optimists and hence over-value their own ability and the predicted performance of their 
investments (de Meza and Southey, 1996; Coelho and de Meza, 2012), although there is 
evidence that differences in perceptions about banks willingness to supply loans can affect 
entrepreneurs decisions (Kwong, Jones-Evans, and Thompson, 2012).  
In line with classic credit rationing theories, when loans are not forthcoming to 
entrepreneurs with viable investment opportunities then lending is at a sub-optimal level and 
banks suffer from lower profit, some of which could be used for future lending. On the 
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demand-side, when entrepreneurs with viable investment opportunities do not access loans 
which they would have received, then there is a sub-optimal level of investment (under-
investment) from the entrepreneurial sector, and this can result in lower returns to 
entrepreneurial ability (human capital) at the micro level and lower rates of innovation, 
fewer jobs created, and generally lower levels of economic growth at the macro level. 
In the context of our study, what happens in the market for small business finance when 
an economy has entered a deep and persistent economic recession, which the UK did in 
September 2008, is of great importance. Lown and Morgan (2006) examined how banks 
credit standards (non-price loan contract features) impact on future credit rationing. The 
overarching question posed was, ‘To what extent do banks allocate business loans by 
changing standards compared to loan rates?’ Their evidence shows that the credit cycle and 
the business cycle act in opposite ways as far as loan supply is concerned. They conclude 
that credit standards are more informative about future lending than are loan rates, i.e. loans 
are rationed via changes in standards not rates. In a related paper, Hanousek and Filer (2004) 
argue that the way that banks allocate loanable funds is the main cause of credit rationing for 
small firms, as investment generally flows to industries (not explicitly firms) with the 
greatest profit potential. 
Thus there appears to be a gap in our knowledge in terms of what really happens to 
SMEs’ lending from the demand-side (as well as a supply-side) when an economic downturn 
occurs and persists for a number of years. This is important as loan applications are not 
costless and involve collating financial information and formalising an investment focused 
business plan with cash-flows forecasts and revenue projections. Further, these costs are 
likely to vary substantially across entrepreneurs, with relatively inexperienced entrepreneurs 
incurring the highest application costs. Thus we focus on the demand for credit from 
entrepreneurs and how this is affected by dynamics on the supply-side of the credit market in 
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a prolonged recessionary environment. This is outside of the more traditional focus of credit 
rationing theories which focus on lenders (suppliers of credit) inability to accurately assess 
(entrepreneurs) risk due to information problems. 
Based on the above discussion, we formulate the following hypotheses regarding small 
business loan demand: 
HD1: More profitable SMEs are less likely to seek bank finance. 
HD2: SMEs with higher owner control interests are less likely to seek bank finance. 
HD3: In a recessionary environment, SMEs are more likely to incorrectly assess firm-
level risks so more risky SMEs are more likely to apply for bank finance. 
HD4: SMEs with higher credit support and lower financial delinquency are more likely 
to have a higher demand for bank finance. 
2.3. Rationale, Practices and Effectiveness of Government Support Initiatives 
Lerner (1999) suggests that the rationales for public intervention to improve SMEs’ 
ability to access to private financing are twofold. First, the spillover hypothesis argues that 
SMEs are able to generate positive externalities, by creating new jobs, new ideas, and new 
abilities that other industries and the economy as a whole may enjoy (Cressy and Olofsson 
1997; Cressy, 2002; Lerner, 1999). The second rationale for government intervention is the 
existence of market failures, such as the presence of asymmetric information in terms of 
adverse selection and moral hazard (Hyytinen and Väänänen, 2006). Thus, the availability of 
risk capital for small and highly innovative companies, young enterprises, and firms located 
in depressed areas has been a key policy issue for the government in order to promote not 
only the growth of these SMEs, but also the whole economy (Lawton, 2002).  
In terms of difficulties of SMEs in accessing debt capital, (partial) credit guarantee 
schemes are the most widely used, and long-standing, public policy supporting mechanism 
worldwide (Cowling and Siepel (2013) provide a review on several international loan 
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guarantee schemes) given the commonly existed credit rationing in small firm loan market 
(Cowling and Mitchell, 2003; Honaghan, 2008; Klapper et al., 2006; Riding, 1998). The 
objective of such schemes is almost unanimously to provide loan security to SMEs who 
would not otherwise be able to obtain debt finance through conventional means (Cowling 
and Clay, 1995; Riding, 1998).  
However, empirical evidence regarding the effectiveness of loan guarantee schemes 
remains mixed (Cowling and Siepel, 2013) and it is still a major policy challenge to ensure 
that public interventions actually assist small firms, not subsidise risky firms (Astebro and 
Bernhardt, 2003; Riding, 1998). In terms of the UK experience, the Small Firm Loan 
Guarantee (SFLG) programme has been the Government’s primary debt finance instrument 
over the past decades until it was replaced by the Enterprise Finance Guarantee (EFG) 
programme in 2009. The aim of SFLG is to assist viable, debt-appropriate businesses that 
lack sufficient collateral to access loan finance in the market (Graham, 2004). Recently, 
there has been a series of empirical studies that evaluate the effectiveness and performance 
of the programme (Cowling, 2007a, 2007b, 2008, 2010; Cowling and Mitchell, 2003; 
Cowling and Siepel, 2013). Generally speaking, empirical evidence suggests that the 
rationale for public intervention is justified in the sense that SFLG has allowed certain types 
of small firm borrowers to access bank funding (Cowling, 2010) and/or improved supported 
firms’ performance (Cowling and Siepel, 2013). However, the true extent of credit rationing 
and thus the rationale for SFLG is found to be inconclusive (Cowling, 2010) and its ability to 
correct for capital market imperfections limited (Cowling and Mitchell, 2003). Further, 
Graham (2004) questioned the effectiveness and relevance of SFLG under the current 
economic context. EGF was introduced as a Government response to Graham 
recommendations in order to improve the availability of capital to a wider range of 
businesses yet it is too early to assess the appropriateness of this response. 
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3. Data and Variables  
3.1. Sample 
This section describes the data source for this study and the survey method from which 
the data is derived, followed by a discussion on both the dependent and independent 
variables used in the analysis. 
The data corresponds to six waves of the SME Finance Monitor surveys conducted by 
BDRC Continental. The first survey wave was in July 2011, with subsequent waves carried 
out in November 2011, March 2012, May 2012, November 2012, and the most recent wave 
in March 2013. In total this represents 30,183 completed surveys with SMEs. In order to 
qualify for interview, SMEs had to meet the following criteria in addition to the quotas by 
size, sector, and region: 
• not 50%+ owned by another company 
• not run as a social enterprise or as a not for profit organisation 
• turnover of less than £25m 
• The respondent was the person in charge of managing the business’s finances. No 
changes have been made to the screening criteria in any of the waves conducted to 
date. 
Quotas were set overall by size of business, by number of employees. The classic B2B 
sample structure over-samples the larger SMEs compared to their natural representation in 
the SME population, in order to generate robust sub-samples of these bigger SMEs. Fewer 
interviews were conducted with 0 employee businesses to allow for these extra interviews. 
Each quarter’s sample matched the previous quarter’s results as closely as possible. Quotas 
were set overall to reflect the natural profile by sector, but with some amendments to ensure 
that a robust sub-sample was available for each sector. Thus, fewer interviews were 
conducted in Construction and Property/Business Services to allow for interviews in other 
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sectors to be increased, in particular for Agriculture and Hotels. The weighting regime was 
initially applied separately to each quarter. The six were then combined and grossed to the 
total of 4,548,843 SMEs, based on BIS SME data. This ensured that each individual wave is 
representative of all SMEs while the total interviews conducted are weighted to the total of 
all SMEs. 
3.2. Dependent variables 
Panel A of Table 1 shows the definition of dependent variables, which capture SMEs’ 
demand for, and banks supply of, external finance. Both variables are binary variables and 
static in nature. Demand for finance is defined as whether firm owners reported having 
sought/applied for finance for their businesses in the previous twelve months. Supply of 
finance is defined as whether the firm obtained (all or part of) the finance required. On 
average between July 2011 and March 2013, 17.4% of smaller firms had sought debt finance.  
3.3. Explanatory variables 
Independent variables in this study can be classified into four groups: firm 
characteristics, owner characteristics, time indicators, and firm-level risk indicators. As 
discussed in the previous section, these variables are related to the development stage of the 
firm and the degree of information opacity between the firm and finance suppliers, which 
have been shown to be significant in explaining the supply of and demand for finance by 
prior studies. Panel B of Table 1 defines the explanatory variables by these four groups. 
Firm characteristics include size, legal status, sector, firm age, and performance. Firm 
size is measured by sales turnover. This is grouped into 9 bands with an upper limit of 
£9.99m. Legal status is defined by four categories including sole trader, partnership, LLP 
and Limited liability. Sector is defined as nine one-digit SIC codes. Age is defined in six 
categories from <12 months old to >15 years old. We have two measures of performance 
available to us. Firstly, we have a profit dummy variable and secondly a fast-growth variable.  
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Owner characteristics or human capital measures consist of gender, (highest) formal 
educational qualification, prior business experience, and whether or not the owner holds a 
financial qualification. 
Firm-level risk indicators include the Experian risk classification and six independent 
measures of financial delinquency including non-payment of loans, unauthorised overdraft 
borrowing, bouncing cheques, County Court Judgements, late payment of tax, and trade 
credit restrictions. 
We also consider additional control variables regarding the firm’s source of finance, 
business activities and possible credit support provided for finance application. Regarding 
the source of finance, we look at whether a firm has any other loans outstanding at the time 
of application or use own equity to fund the firm. Business activities concern firms’ 
operating behaviours including innovation, the development of new process and products, 
and the degree of internationalisation (whether the firm exports products overseas). The 
availability of business plans and collateral is used as a proxy for financial security or credit 
support for the firm’s application. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
3.4. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables. The 
data for loan demand (SOUGHT) shows that on average over the period measured 17.4% of 
business owners had sought external finance. The lowest level of demand was in November 
2011 when only 10.5% of firms applied for funds. This is approximately half the level 
recorded in May 2012 when 21.0% applied for funds. In an earlier study on the finance of 
UK SMEs between 2008 and 2010, which covered the whole duration of the official 
recession (Cowling, Liu and Ledger, 2012), loan demand is found to be higher (24%), 
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though the study was based on a different sample of SMEs. This may imply the 
improvement of UK SMEs’ average cash position in the post-recession periods, which 
serves to reduce firms’ demand for external sources of capital. 
Among those requiring finance, on average 83.3% were successful in raising a loan. 
This is lower than the pre-recession figure of almost 90%, but higher than the 70% success 
rate reported for UK SMEs in the 2008-2010 period (Cowling, Liu and Ledger, 2012). Again 
there is variation over time. Here we note that the lowest success rate for loan applications 
was 67.5% in November 2011, and the highest success rate was 89.8% in March 2012. 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 illustrates the changing dynamics of loan demand and supply during 
the next phase of the recession (between July 2011 and March 2013). 
Fig 2: Loan Demand 
[INSERT FIG 2 HERE] 
 
Fig 3: Loan Supply 
[INSERT FIG 3 HERE] 
 
The two key dynamics in terms of both loan demand and loan supply are (a) that they 
rose over time as more loans were requested and a higher proportion were granted, and, 
(b)that both demand and supply became more stable and less subject to variation quarter to 
quarter. This suggests that the market is moving back onto a stable equilibrium path after the 
obvious mismatch between supply and demand for loans in the immediate aftermath of the 
financial crisis and the first two years of recession (as identified in Cowling, Liu and Ledger, 
2012). It is worth noting that the equivalent figures for 2007, when the UK economy was in 
a boom were demand at 26.8% of SMEs and supply of loans had an 89.3% application 
success rate. This evidence poses questions about the scale of any lending shortfalls assumed 
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by the UK Government’s “Business Bank” proposal, although it is too early to factor in the 
effects of the Basle III capital adequacy requirements on credit availability. 
4. Multivariate regression results 
 
Here we econometrically model the demand for and supply of external debt finance 
between July 2011 and March 2013, the third and fourth years of the current economic 
recession. The demand-side variable is named SOUGHT, and is coded 1 if a business sought 
external finance and 0 otherwise. The supply-side variable is named GOT, and is coded 1 if 
the business who sought external finance was successful in securing at least part of the 
finance and 0 if they were unsuccessful. By definition, the outcome of a finance application 
is only recorded if a firm actually sought finance (Cosh et al., 2009). As both of the 
dependent variables are by construction binary variables, a probit model with selection1 is 
used and the maximum likelihood coefficient estimates are shown in Table 32. We use this 
econometric method, to test for sample selection effects given the possible non-randomness 
of loan application decisions. We are particularly interested in how demand and supply 
changes when the economy moves deeper into a prolonged recession so we are particularly 
interested in the time dynamics. For the identification to be valid, the model requires that the 
selection (i.e. demand) equation includes at least one variable that is not included in the main 
probit (i.e. supply) equation. Here we use 12 geographical region indicators as the demand-
specific variables in the model as they are found to be significantly associated with loan 
demand but have no explanatory power for loan supply. 
Model 1 of Table 3 is our primary regression for credit demand and supply. The 
correlation coefficient between the selection and main equations is -0.79 and is significant at 
                                                            
1 See Van de Ven and Van Pragg (1981) for an introduction of the model. 
2 As an alternative, we also fitted the data using the logit model and the results are not significantly different 
from the probit estimations. 
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1 per cent level, indicating the existence of selection bias and the validity of our model. 
However, the negative value implies that loan applicants have a lower chance to get the loan 
than either a random business or a non-applicant. On the one hand, it is possible that higher-
quality firms underestimate the true supply of credit during the recession thus choose to 
scale down their investment activities. On the other hand, this could be a sign of credit 
market inefficiency as loan suppliers have failed to create a self-selection mechanism 
through which lower-quality businesses are discouraged from borrowing in the first place. It 
can be seen that the demand for debt finance is increasing in a monotonic way in firm size 
(measured by sales turnover). Demand is also positively related to firm age. Prior 
performance is found to have different effects on the demand for finance. Here we find that 
profitable firms had a lower demand for finance, in line with an increased ability to self-
finance and more broadly with pecking order theories (Cosh et al., 2009), which is consistent 
with HD1. But fast growth firms had a marginally higher demand for external debt 
(significant at the 10% level). Legal form was found to differentiate between firms. Here 
partnerships had the highest loan demand and LLP’s the lowest demand. At the sector level 
we see the highest level of demand for loans amongst manufacturers. Consistent with earlier 
research (Carter and Shaw, 2006; Coleman and Cohn, 2000; Cowling, Liu and Ledger, 2012), 
female entrepreneurs are less likely to seek external finance than male entrepreneurs. This 
suggests that risk aversion based theories might help explain why women appear more 
reluctant to borrow than men. Interestingly, loan demand approximated an inverted ‘U’ 
shape for both owners business experience and owners education, peaking amongst owners 
with 10-15 years experience and amongst owners with school and lower level vocational 
qualifications.  In terms of the time dynamics of loan demand, we observe an inverted ‘U’ 
shape with demand low at the start of the period in July 2011 and the end of the period, 
March 2011. The local peak in loan demand was in May 2012. 
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Our key findings here relate to risk and financial delinquency. If more risky firms with 
a track record of financial delinquency are more likely to seek loans, then it should not be a 
public policy issue if they fail to receive them. This would be behaviours consistent with 
banks acting rationally. The results show quite clearly that loan demand is increasing with 
the risk (as measured by the Experian credit rating) of a firm. In short the less creditworthy a 
firm is, the more likely they are to ask for a loan. This is a sign that SMEs in an economic 
downturn appear to be over-optimistic and incorrectly assess their risk, thus providing 
support for HD3. In addition, we find that firms that have unauthorised overdraft are also 
more likely to request a loan, as is the case for firms with late tax payments who have a 
higher probability of seeking a loan. In contrast, firms that are bouncing cheques (having 
them re-presented to the bank due to insufficient funds) have a lower probability demanding 
a loan. Therefore, HD4 is only partly supported. 
Adding further controls to the model reduces the correlation between the selection and 
main equations, but it is still significant at 10% level. Firms with no loans outstanding at 
time of application prefer to remain unlevered, whilst SMEs financed using own equity are 
more likely to apply for bank finance, implying that entrepreneurs with control interests are 
reluctant to give up their controls so they prefer debt to equity finance (HD2). Businesses that 
introduced new process are more likely to apply for finance but the odds of firms with new 
products applying for finance are on the other hand, lower. Loan demands are higher for 
firms with formal business plans, which is usually an essential prerequisite for banks to 
process the firms’ applications. 
Here we consider the supply of loans (GOT) conditional upon the firm applying in the 
first place. The first points of note are that firm size and sector did not appear to play a major 
role in the determination of whether or not a loan application was granted. The latter finding 
contradicts the argument of Hanousek and Filer (2004) that credit flows to industries with 
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the greatest profit potential. It also questions the role that firm size has in reducing 
information asymmetries, achieving economies of scale in lending, and reducing transactions 
costs (Berger and Udell, 1998; Cassar, 2004; Titman and Wessels, 1988; Wald, 1999). But it 
was also the case that there was a positive and significant effect of firm age on the 
probability of being offered a loan, having applied. The finding is in line with the 
conventional wisdom that banks are less likely to provide finance to seed or start-up firms 
given their risk, thus providing support for HS1. It suggests that the early UK recession 
findings that banks moved to a smaller set of key risk indicators including firm age when 
there was uncertainty in the economy (Cowling, Liu and Ledger, 2012) still hold over the 
entire and prolonged recessionary cycle. Legal status was also important with limited 
liability firms having the highest probability of being granted a loan, which offers support 
for credibility and legitimacy theories. 
The results also show that fast growth firms are marginally less likely to secure loans 
which might suggest that banks prefer incremental (managed) growth than the risk of 
accelerated growth. Previous profitability also had no bearing on the banks loan decision. 
But women entrepreneurs had a higher loan approval rate, despite a lower general demand 
for loans. Perhaps surprisingly, entrepreneurial experience was not found to influence the 
banks’ loan decision but entrepreneurs with financial qualifications were more likely to be 
granted loans. The latter effect suggests that banks respond favourably to evidence of formal 
human capital which manifests itself through more sophisticated, and possibly realistic, 
financial projections in loan applications. This finding does not appear to hold for more 
general formal human capital captured by educational qualifications. In fact the results 
suggest that mid-range, vocational, qualifications (e.g HNC, BTEC and professional 
qualifications) reduce the probability of loan applications being granted. 
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On risk per se, the results strongly suggest that banks dislike any level of risk above the 
most minimal.  The predicted success rate for firms with a minimal risk credit rating is 
97.3%, but for firms with above average risk this declines to 60.1%. We also find that our 
measures of financial delinquency, with the notable exception of late tax payments, all 
reduced the probability of loan requests being granted. In order of importance problems with 
accessing trade credit was the most limiting factor for banks, followed by County Court 
Judgements (CCJs), bouncing cheques, and then unauthorised overdraft facilities and 
missing loan repayments. Therefore, HS2 is fully supported. 
We also estimated the same general model but replaced the individual financial 
delinquency variables with a single count variable of the number of instances of financial 
delinquency for each firm. We also allowed for a squared term for this count variable to 
capture any non-linear structure to the effects. The predicted effect on loan supply is quite 
dramatic in that any financial delinquency reduces loan supply. But the key feature is that for 
any financial delinquency count over two instances, the probability of a loan request being 
granted is increasingly unlikely. 
It is very clear that banks take any evidence of risk and financial delinquency very 
seriously and this forms a huge part of their decision to lend or not to lend when presented 
with a loan application. Stability and track record, captured in older firms, also gives banks a 
greater sense of security when deciding to lend or not. Further re-assurance is gained when a 
key member of the ownership team has a financial qualification. It is also clear that even in 
recession the majority of firms that seek bank loans receive them. But it is also clear that 
high risk and/or low quality firms who seek funding are increasingly less likely to get loans 
in a prolonged recession. 
Some of the additional control variables are also found to be significantly associated 
with the likelihood of loan approval. Firms with no loan outstanding and thus a lower credit 
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risk are more likely to get the finance required. On the other hand, firms financed using own 
equity have a lower probability of success in loan applications. This finding is generally in 
line with traditional corporate control theories, where the cost of monitoring (stockholders’ 
behaviours) is an important concern for debt investors. Interestingly, firms that introduce 
new products or export overseas during an economic downturn have lower odds of 
successful application, probably because of the higher cost and therefore higher risks 
associated with such activities. This finding warrants an interesting future research topic that 
links SMEs recessionary business strategy to entrepreneurial finance. Finally, the availability 
of collateral increases the chance of securing the needed finance (HS3). Business plan has a 
counter-intuitive effect on loan supply (β = -0.097), although the coefficient estimate is only 
significant at 10 per cent level. 
As a robustness check, we further differentiate loan application outcomes by dividing 
successful applicants into those that got all the finance required (fully financed) and those 
only securing part of the finance needed (partially rationed). We use the multinomial logit 
model to compare the characteristics of non-applicants, fully rationed (failed), partially 
rationed and fully financed applicants, with fully financed applicants as the base category 
(results reported in the Appendix). Using multinomial logit regression ignores the obvious 
and significant conditionality between loan supply and demand, so the results should be 
viewed with caution. Our main finding here, is that there is no systematic difference between 
firms that got all and part of the finance sought. The only criterion that differentiates 
partially rationed firms from their ‘more successful’ counterparts is the degree of financial 
delinquency: SMEs with records of unauthorised overdraft and/or problems in getting trade 
credit are less likely to get the full amount of finance required. Other than that, the findings 
are generally in line with our main empirical models.   
5. Discussion and conclusion 
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It is very clear that banks take any evidence of risk and financial delinquency very 
seriously and this forms a huge part of their decision to lend or not to lend when presented 
with a loan application. Stability and track record, captured in older firms, also gives banks a 
greater sense of security when deciding to lend or not. Further re-assurance is gained when a 
key member of the ownership team has a financial qualification. It is also clear that even in 
recession the majority of firms that seek bank loans receive them. But it is also clear that 
high risk and/or low quality firms who seek funding are increasing less likely to get loans in 
a prolonged recession.  
So where do the mismatches occur between firms seeking loans and banks supplying 
them? And is there evidence that some good firms are not getting loans or is it simply that 
too many bad quality firms are applying for loans. The former would be evidence in support 
of the UK governments ‘Business Bank’ and the latter evidence in favour of banks acting 
rationally, and diligently, in the face of huge liquidity issues and the implementation of the 
Basle III regime in Europe. 
We do find evidence of a deterrent effect in the market as the firms and entrepreneurs 
least likely to get offered a loan do not apply in the first place. This suggests that information 
based problems may not be as acute as assumed. But this is confounded by our evidence that 
loan demand is strongly increasing in firm risk whilst loan supply is strongly decreasing in 
firm risk. This is supportive of the de Meza and Southey (1996) over-optimism arguments. 
The evidence also points to the fact that firms with a record of financial delinquency also 
have a higher demand for loans but are also less likely to receive them, which is generally 
supportive of the argument that banks are efficient and rational processors of information. 
This presents an interesting quandary. Firstly, we could simply say that banks are being 
perfectly rational in denying firms with a bad track record of financial delinquency loans. 
But we could also argue that if the underlying quality of the firm is good, and they are 
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simply experiencing cash flow problems in the recession, then denying loans to such firms is 
exacerbating these short-term problems. 
What is also clear, as we enter the fifth year of recession, is that loans are more widely 
available in general, particularly when compared to the first two years of recession. In this 
sense it could be argued that the case for public intervention, certainly on the scale proposed 
by the UK Government for the “Business Bank”, is debatable. In terms of predicted total 
numbers of SMEs denied loans we calculate that it is around 40,000 firms currently. But if 
we exclude the very highest risk class of firms, this estimate falls to around 30,000 firms out 
of a total SME sector of 1.21m firms (Fig 4). Note that this estimate excludes single self-
employed individuals and their firms which represent 74.53% of the total UK stock.  
Fig 4: Predicted total number of firms denied loans 
[INSERT FIG 4 HERE] 
We conclude that banks have obviously become more cautious when making lending 
decisions. This is evident as lenders have shifted away from informal human capital criteria 
(e.g. experience) towards more direct measures of credit risk including credit ratings and 
instances of financial delinquency. In addition, firm age is also important with older firms 
deemed less risky to lend to. Financial constraints are evident during the recession but they 
are not observed consistently across all periods. It is also clear that business cycle theories of 
investment and financing have a great deal of empirical support and traction in recessionary 
environments. 
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Table 1 
Variable definitions 
Panel A: Dependent variables 
Group Variable Name Definition 
Demand for finance  
 SOUGHT = 1 if applying finance in the past 12 months; 0 otherwise 
Supply of finance 
 GOT = 1 if firm receive at least part of the finance applied for; 0 otherwise 
Panel B: Independent variables 
Group Variable Name Definition 
Firm-characteristics  
Size SALES_BAND 1=<£25,000, 2=£25-49,999, 3=£50,000-74, 999, 4=£75,000-99,999, 5=£100,000-
499,999, 6=£500,000-999,999, 7=£1m-1.99m, 8=£2m-4.99m, 9=£5m-9.99m 
Legal status LEGAL 1= Sole Proprietor, 2=Partnership, 3= Limited Liability Partnership, 4= Limited 
Liability 
Industry sector SECTOR 1=Primary, 2= Manufacturing, 3=Construction, 4=Wholesale/Retail, 
5=Hotels/Catering, 6=Transport & Communications, 7=Business Services, 8=Health, 
9=Other Community 
Age FIRM_AGE 1= <12 months, 2= 1-2 years, 3= 2-5 years, 4=6-9 years, 5=10-15 years, 6=>15 years 
Performance PROFIT =1 if firm broke even or made a profit 
 FAST_GROWTH =1 if firm grew by 30% or more; 0 otherwise 
Owner characteristics  
Gender WLED = 1 if firm is a women-led business; 0 otherwise 
Education ONWER_EDUC 1=None, 2=GCSE, 3= A level, 4= HNC, 5=BTEC, 6=Professional, 7=Degree, 8=Post-
graduate Degree, 9=Other 
Prior experience OWNER_EXP 1= <12 months, 2= 1-3 years, 3= 4-6 years, 4=7-9 years, 5=10-15 years, 6=>15 years 
Financial 
Qualification 
FIN_QUAL =1 if owner has a financial qualification; 0 otherwise 
Time indicators WAVE1 = 1 if July-2011 Survey; 0 otherwise 
WAVE2 = 1 if November-2011Survey; 0 otherwise 
 WAVE3 = 1 if March-2012 Survey; 0 otherwise 
 WAVE4 = 1 if May-2012 Survey; 0 otherwise 
 WAVE5 = 1 if November-2012 Survey; 0 otherwise 
 WAVE6 = 1 if March-2013 Survey; 0 otherwise 
Risk indicators  
Experian Credit Rating RISK = 1if minimal, 2 if low risk, 3 if average risk and 4 if above average risk  
Financial Delinquency  
Missed loan repayment 
Unauthorised overdraft 
facility 
Bounced cheques 
County court judgement 
Late tax 
Trade credit restrictions 
None 
FD_LR 
FD_OD 
 
FD_BC 
FD_CCJ 
 
FD_TAX 
FD_TCR 
 
FD_NONE 
= 1 if missed loan repayment; 0 otherwise 
= 1 if had unauthorised overdraft facility; 0 otherwise 
 
= 1 if bounced cheques; 0 otherwise 
= 1 if has County Court Judgement; 0 otherwise 
 
= 1 if missed tax payments; 0 otherwise 
= 1 if has trade credit restrictions; 0 otherwise 
 
= 1 if no financial delinquency; 0 otherwise 
Additional Control Variables  
Source of funds NO_OTHER_LOAN = 1 if no other outstanding loans; 0 otherwise 
 OWN_EQUITY = 1 if entrepreneur uses own equity; 0 otherwise 
Business activities INNOVATOR = 1 undertook innovation activities; 0 otherwise 
 NEW_PROCESS = 1if  introduced new or significantly improved process; 0 otherwise 
 NEW_PRODUCTS = 1 if introduced new or significantly improved products; 0 otherwise 
 EXPORTER = 1 if business export products or services overseas; 0 otherwise 
Credit support BUSINESS PLAN = 1 if has a formal written business plan; 0 otherwise 
 COLLATERAL = 1if provided security/collateral; 0 otherwise 
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Table 2 
Variable Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Dependent variables 
Group Variable Name Mean Std Dev 
Demand for finance   
 
 
SOUGHT 0.1735 0.3787 
Supply of finance 
   GOT 0.8489 0.3582 
Panel B: Independent variables 
   Group Variable Name  
 Firm-characteristics 
  Size SALES_BAND 
  <£25,000 0.3683 
 £25,000 - £49,999 0.2153 
 £50,000 - £74,999 0.0971 
£75,000 - £99,999 0.0539 
£100,000 - £499,999 0.1203 
£500,000 - £999,999 0.0350 
£1m - £1.99m 0.0176 
£2m - £4.9m 0.0092 
 
£5m - £9.9m 0.0034 
 Legal status LEGAL 
  
 
Sole proprietorship 0.6740 
 
 
Partnership 0.0486 
 Limited liability partnership (LLP) 0.0149 
Limited liability(LTD) 0.2624 
Industry sector SECTOR 
Primary 0.0431 
Manufacturing 0.0657 
Construction 0.2271 
 
Wholesale / retail 0.1207 
 
 
Hotels / catering 0.0329 
 
 
Transport & communications 0.0688 
 
 
Business services 0.2604 
 Health 0.0615 
Other community 0.1198 
Age FIRM_AGE 
<12 months 0.0958 
1-2 years 0.1051 
2-5 years 0.2482 
 
6-9 years 0.1644 
 
 
10-15 years 0.1378 
 
 
15+ years 0.2487 
 Performance PROFIT 0.6798 0.4666 
FAST_GROWTH 0.1249 0.3307 
Owner characteristics 
Gender WLED 0.2546 0.4357 
Education ONWER_EDUC 
None 0.1271 
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GCSE 0.1370 
 A level 0.0799 
HNC 0.0625 
BTEC 0.1906 
Professional qualification 0.1128 
Degree 0.1395 
Post graduate degree 0.0930 
 
Other 0.0108 
 Prior experience OWNER_EXP 
  
 
<12 months 0.0549 
 
 
1-2 years 0.1528 
 2-5 years 0.1460 
6-9 years 0.0984 
10-15 years 0.1551 
15+ years 0.3837 
Financial FIN_QUAL 0.3861 0.4869 
Qualification 
Time indicators WAVE1 0.1691 
 
 
WAVE2 0.1689 
 
 
WAVE3 0.1674 
 
 
WAVE4 0.1678 
 WAVE5 0.1671 
WAVE6 0.1597 
Risk indicators 
Experian Credit Rating RISK 
Minimal 0.0451 
Low 0.0999 
 
Average 0.2693 
 
 
Above average 0.4377 
 
 
Not known 0.1480 
 Financial Delinquency 
   Missed loan repayment FD_LR 0.0152 0.1225 
Unauthorised overdraft facility FD_OD 0.0684 0.2525 
Bounced cheques FD_BC 0.0550 0.2280 
County court judgement FD_CCJ 0.0123 0.1101 
Late tax FD_TAX 0.0493 0.2165 
Trade credit restrictions FD_TCR 0.0322 0.1766 
None FD_NONE 0.8368 0.3695 
Additional Controls    
Source of funds NO_OTHER_LOAN 0.8331  
 OWN_EQUITY 0.0948  
Business activities INNOVATOR 0.4774  
 NEW_PROCESS 0.3041  
 NEW_PRODUCTS 0.2094  
 EXPORTER 0.1214  
Credit support BUSINESS PLAN 0.4248  
 COLLATERAL 0.2571  
Note: N = 30,183, except for COLLATERAL (N = 7,840), where data is only collected for firms that applied 
for finance.
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Table 3 
Loan Demand and Supply Probit Models with Sample Selection 
Model 1 Model 2 
Independent variables GOT|SOUGHT SOUGHT GOT|SOUGHT SOUGHT 
Group Variable Name Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error 
Firm Characteristics     
Size SALES_BAND     
£25,000 - £49,999 -0.062 0.080 0.154*** 0.038 0.005 0.103 0.111*** 0.042 
£50,000 - £74,999 -0.227** 0.092 0.388*** 0.043 -0.073 0.119 0.293*** 0.048 
£75,000 - £99,999 -0.075 0.111 0.457*** 0.047 0.179 0.142 0.315*** 0.053 
£100,000 - £499,999 -0.209** 0.088 0.590*** 0.036 -0.022 0.115 0.409*** 0.041 
£500,000 - £999,999 -0.130 0.100 0.498*** 0.042 0.030 0.127 0.317*** 0.047 
£1m - £1.99m -0.183* 0.106 0.697*** 0.043 0.051 0.135 0.389*** 0.048 
£2m - £4.9m -0.052 0.121 0.751*** 0.045 0.250* 0.156 0.451*** 0.051 
£5m - £9.9m -0.104 0.143 0.747*** 0.054 0.206 0.182 0.409*** 0.061 
Legal  LEGAL     
status Partnership 0.077 0.076 0.227*** 0.033 0.214** 0.096 0.162*** 0.036 
LLP  0.468*** 0.141 -0.293*** 0.049 0.403** 0.177 -0.303*** 0.055 
LTD 0.006 0.053 -0.029 0.026 0.027 0.070 -0.090*** 0.029 
Industry  SECTOR     
sector Manufacturing -0.014 0.097 -0.365*** 0.041 -0.018 0.126 -0.303*** 0.046 
Construction 0.089 0.088 -0.410*** 0.037 -0.053 0.116 -0.318*** 0.041 
Wholesale / retail 0.183* 0.099 -0.301*** 0.040 0.171 0.125 -0.246*** 0.045 
Hotels / catering -0.149 0.100 -0.396*** 0.042 -0.278** 0.131 -0.339*** 0.047 
Transport & com -0.062 0.097 -0.303*** 0.042 -0.166 0.125 -0.252*** 0.046 
Business services 0.053 0.089 -0.345*** 0.037 0.021 0.117 -0.333*** 0.041 
Health 0.061 0.105 -0.326*** 0.043 0.016 0.136 -0.323*** 0.048 
Other community 0.032 0.099 -0.434*** 0.040 -0.023 0.131 -0.436*** 0.045 
Age FIRM_AGE     
1-2 years 0.027 0.111 0.057 0.065 0.062*** 0.145 0.058 0.074 
2-5 years 0.400*** 0.122 0.066 0.059 0.493*** 0.152 0.126* 0.067 
6-9 years 0.574*** 0.136 0.174*** 0.060 0.703*** 0.172 0.243*** 0.068 
10-15 years 0.560*** 0.140 0.235*** 0.060 0.686*** 0.177 0.322*** 0.068 
15+ years 0.568*** 0.138 0.238*** 0.059 0.663*** 0.176 0.328*** 0.067 
Performance PROFIT 0.019 0.018 -0.070*** 0.008 0.176*** 0.055 0.005 0.022 
FAST_GROWTH -0.098* 0.054 0.043 0.025 -0.048 0.070 0.019 0.028 
Owner Characteristics     
Gender WLED 0.095** 0.046 -0.046*** 0.020 0.102* 0.059 -0.063*** 0.023 
Education ONWER_EDUC     
GCSE -0.132* 0.074 0.254*** 0.034 -0.088 0.097 0.219*** 0.038 
A level 0.032 0.093 0.226*** 0.040 0.204* 0.122 0.155*** 0.044 
HNC -0.245*** 0.088 0.231*** 0.043 -0.193* 0.114 0.129*** 0.048 
BTEC -0.176** 0.074 0.193*** 0.035 -0.144 0.097 0.150*** 0.039 
Professional -0.186** 0.077 0.210*** 0.035 -0.187* 0.101 0.170*** 0.039 
Degree -0.106 0.076 0.169*** 0.034 -0.015 0.101 0.112*** 0.038 
Postgraduate -0.063 0.087 0.103*** 0.038 -0.001 0.113 0.067 0.043 
Other -0.073 0.219 0.348*** 0.099 -0.088 0.256 0.205* 0.113 
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Prior  OWNER_EXP     
experience 
1-2 years -0.119 0.154 0.177** 0.082 -0.001 0.206 0.230** 0.095 
2-5 years -0.046 0.157 0.170** 0.082 0.060 0.210 0.207** 0.094 
6-9 years -0.210 0.160 0.162** 0.084 -0.109 0.214 0.193** 0.096 
10-15 years -0.142 0.155 0.254*** 0.080 -0.004 0.208 0.270*** 0.093 
15+ years 0.006 0.154 0.213*** 0.079 0.143 0.208 0.259*** 0.091 
 FIN_QUAL 0.096 0.044 0.002 0.019 0.161 0.056 -0.048** 0.021 
Time Indicators     
 
WAVE2 0.010 0.063 -0.143*** 0.030 -0.017 0.083 -0.122*** 0.035 
 
WAVE3 0.144** 0.073 0.310*** 0.028 0.153 0.108 0.548*** 0.032 
WAVE4 0.195*** 0.076 0.336*** 0.028 0.267** 0.119 0.582*** 0.032 
WAVE5 0.032 0.067 0.301*** 0.028 0.024 0.101 0.521*** 0.032 
WAVE6 0.163** 0.071 -0.017 0.034 0.037 0.096 0.263*** 0.039 
Risk Indicators     
Experian  RISK     
Credit Rating 
Low -0.201** 0.084 0.232*** 0.029 -0.173 0.110 0.188*** 0.032 
Average -0.273*** 0.082 0.327*** 0.028 -0.245** 0.108 0.258*** 0.032 
Above average -0.383*** 0.083 0.357*** 0.031 -0.359*** 0.109 0.265*** 0.035 
Not known -0.382*** 0.095 0.316*** 0.038 -0.388*** 0.123 0.257*** 0.043 
Financial Delinquency     
 FD_LR -0.187* 0.105 0.062 0.070 -0.204 0.130 0.027 0.077 
 FD_OD -0.172*** 0.066 0.345*** 0.039 -0.097 0.084 0.271*** 0.043 
 FD_BC -0.213*** 0.068 -0.092** 0.040 -0.318*** 0.086 -0.109** 0.044 
 FD_CCJ -0.369*** 0.113 -0.064 0.071 -0.411*** 0.142 -0.141* 0.079 
 FD_TAX -0.019 0.065 0.114*** 0.040 -0.021 0.081 0.047 0.044 
 FD_TCR -0.501*** 0.076 0.007 0.045 -0.586*** 0.099 -0.090* 0.050 
 FD_NONE 0.343*** 0.067 -0.284*** 0.040 0.271*** 0.085 -0.180*** 0.044 
Additional Control Variables       
Source of  NO_OTHER_LOAN     1.095*** 0.192 -1.694*** 0.023 
funds 
OWN_EQUITY     -0.355*** 0.069 0.316*** 0.030 
Business INNOVATOR     -0.040 0.138 0.046 0.055 
activities 
NEW_PROCESS     -0.072 0.128 0.108** 0.051 
 NEW_PRODUCTS     -0.123* 0.068 -0.061** 0.028 
EXPORTER -0.252*** 0.077 -0.025 0.031 
Credit BUSINESS PLAN     -0.097* 0.053 0.142*** 0.020 
support 
COLLATERAL     1.454*** 0.132   
Regression Diagnostics         
N Obs 30,183 30,160    
Censored 23,043 23,025    
Uncensored 7,140 7135    
Wald χ2 (64) 599.45 1,172.09    
Prob >χ2 0.00001 0.00001    
 ρ -0.793 -0.457    
LR Test if 
Independence χ2 (1) 7.620 2.810    
Prob >χ2 0.006 0.094    
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01. Asymptotic robust standard errors reported.
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Appendix 
Multinomial Logit Regression: Loan Application Outcomes  
(Base category = fully financed applicants) 
Non-Applicants Partial Rationing Full Rationing 
Independent variables (N = 23,043) (N = 237) (N = 716) 
Group Variable Name Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error 
Firm-characteristics   
Size SALES_BAND   
 
<£25,000   
 
£25,000 - £49,999 -0.016 0.135 0.355 0.372 -0.108 0.195 
 
£50,000 - £74,999 -0.604*** 0.142 0.288 0.381 -0.185 0.205 
 
£75,000 - £99,999 -0.540*** 0.153 -0.060 0.440 -0.581** 0.246 
 
£100,000 - £499,999 -0.770*** 0.120 0.145 0.336 -0.536*** 0.182 
 
£500,000 - £999,999 -0.867*** 0.135 0.307 0.372 -0.588*** 0.219 
 
£1m - £1.99m -0.849*** 0.138 0.041 0.387 -0.874*** 0.232 
 
£2m - £4.9m -1.059*** 0.144 -0.038 0.406 -1.315*** 0.270 
£5m - £9.9m -0.984*** 0.165 0.075 0.450 -1.383*** 0.333 
Legal status LEGAL   
Sole proprietorship   
Partnership -0.422*** 0.098 -0.409 0.283 -0.523*** 0.178 
LLP 0.142 0.148 -0.702 0.506 -0.904*** 0.355 
Limited liability(LTD) 0.183** 0.082 0.144 0.216 -0.037 0.133 
Industry sector SECTOR   
Primary   
Manufacturing 0.866*** 0.123 -0.581 0.379 0.494** 0.229 
Construction 0.859*** 0.110 0.203 0.298 0.695*** 0.200 
Wholesale / retail 0.531*** 0.117 -0.055 0.326 0.015 0.235 
Hotels / catering 0.809*** 0.126 0.544* 0.318 1.039*** 0.218 
Trans. & com. 0.754*** 0.125 0.135 0.341 0.856*** 0.218 
Business services 0.864*** 0.108 0.132 0.299 0.508** 0.206 
Health 0.657*** 0.126 0.087 0.352 0.414** 0.247 
Other community 0.827*** 0.118 0.068 0.329 0.537** 0.225 
Age FIRM_AGE   
<12 months   
1-2 years 0.069 0.213 0.119 0.537 -0.025 0.253 
2-5 years 0.150 0.190 0.317 0.485 -0.588** 0.239 
6-9 years -0.088 0.193 0.184 0.493 -1.193*** 0.255 
10-15 years -0.281 0.192 -0.282 0.500 -1.270*** 0.254 
15+ years -0.278 0.188 -0.186 0.489 -1.280*** 0.246 
Performance PROFIT -0.096 0.061 -0.087 0.158 -0.319*** 0.100 
FAST_GROWTH -0.045 0.077 -0.064 0.199 0.133 0.133 
Owner characteristics   
Gender WLED 0.138** 0.062 0.083 0.161 -0.176 0.111 
Education ONWER_EDUC   
None   
GCSE -0.508*** 0.105 0.069 0.294 -0.132 0.177 
A level -0.348*** 0.120 -0.295 0.344 -0.595*** 0.219 
HNC -0.435*** 0.129 -0.160 0.359 -0.102 0.211 
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BTEC -0.128 0.113 0.443 0.292 0.142 0.180 
Professional qualification -0.325*** 0.106 0.035 0.295 -0.009 0.186 
Degree -0.213** 0.106 -0.283 0.304 -0.284 0.185 
Post graduate degree -0.136 0.118 0.359 0.306 -0.204 0.213 
Other -0.838*** 0.281 0.510 0.587 -0.492 0.501 
Prior experience OWNER_EXP   
<12 months   
1-2 years -0.352 0.269 -0.269 0.642 0.021 0.342 
2-5 years -0.307 0.265 -0.273 0.630 -0.184 0.346 
6-9 years -0.295 0.268 -0.870 0.660 0.123 0.353 
10-15 years -0.387 0.257 -0.374 0.618 -0.095 0.335 
15+ years -0.355 0.254 -0.617 0.610 -0.369 0.330 
Financial FIN_QUAL 0.065 0.058 0.245 0.152 -0.240** 0.105 
Qualification   
Time indicators WAVE1   
WAVE2 0.236*** 0.079 0.063 0.229 0.226 0.142 
WAVE3 0.185** 0.084 0.444** 0.225 0.118 0.157 
WAVE4 0.031 0.082 0.252 0.220 -0.144 0.153 
WAVE5 0.221*** 0.083 0.339 0.224 0.367*** 0.144 
WAVE6 0.662*** 0.110 0.499* 0.295 0.697*** 0.175 
Risk indicators   
Experian Credit Rating RISK   
Minimal   
Low -0.255*** 0.083 0.268 0.271 0.216 0.223 
Average -0.286*** 0.083 0.195 0.269 0.324 0.213 
Above average -0.251*** 0.092 0.485* 0.277 0.506** 0.216 
Not known -0.129 0.120 0.444 0.349 0.717*** 0.244 
Financial Delinquency   
Missed loan repayment FD_LR 0.175 0.217 -0.132 0.440 0.308 0.244 
Unauthorised overdraft  FD_OD -0.302*** 0.117 0.545*** 0.217 0.092 0.145 
Bounced cheques FD_BC 0.398*** 0.121 0.288 0.232 0.713*** 0.148 
County court judgement FD_CCJ 0.561** 0.232 -0.418 0.549 1.009*** 0.252 
Late tax FD_TAX -0.221* 0.118 0.155 0.219 -0.175 0.149 
Trade credit restrictions FD_TCR 0.479*** 0.141 1.006*** 0.238 1.343*** 0.161 
None FD_NONE 0.188 0.121 -0.275 0.244 -0.417*** 0.158 
Additional Control Variables   
Source of funds NO_OTHER_LOAN 3.930*** 0.053 0.230 0.162 0.093 0.106 
 OWN_EQUITY -0.653*** 0.076 0.314* 0.168 0.238** 0.121 
Business activities INNOVATOR 0.040 0.150 -0.025 0.356 0.066 0.258 
 NEW_PROCESS -0.310** 0.138 -0.287 0.315 0.001 0.235 
 NEW_PRODUCTS 0.092 0.074 0.505*** 0.189 0.185 0.124 
 EXPORTER 0.124 0.080 0.025 0.218 0.541*** 0.139 
Credit support BUSINESS PLAN -0.275*** 0.055 0.083 0.150 0.045 0.098 
Regression Diagnostics        
N Obs 30,183   
 Log likelihood -8,609.464      
 Pseudo R2 0.4234      
Wald χ2 (64) 12,644.57   
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01. Asymptotic robust standard errors reported. 
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Fig 1: UK economic recessions: How recessions compare
Source: National Institute for Economic and Social Research, 2012. 
 
 
 
Fig 2: Loan Demand Dynamics 
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Fig 3: Loan Supply Dynamics 
 
 
 
 
Fig 4: Predicted total number of firms denied loans
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